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OUTLINE
The Auckland Transport „problem‟
Case study: CBD rail link
– Benefit-cost ratio of 3.5
– Implies ability to self-fund
What might prevent self-funding?
– Provision of public goods
– Inability to extract consumer surplus
– Coordination costs
Possible ways forward
THE AUCKLAND TRANSPORT ‘PROBLEM’
Agreement there is a problem, but causes are 
disputed, including:
– Under-investment in infrastructure
– Traditional cost-benefit analysis techniques create 
too high a hurdle
– Institutional bias towards private transport
– Failure to complete motorway network
– Fragmented planning, funding & implementation
AUCKLAND TRANSPORT PLAN 2009
“A coordinated programme for the delivery of an 
integrated, efficient transport system”
Collaborative planning
– 12 institutions involved (now 4)
Significant projects proposed for 2009-19
– Only partly funded
– Funding is fragmented and siloed
CASE STUDY: CBD RAIL LINK
3.5km of new 
underground rail 
track
3 new stations allow 
greater CBD 
coverage
Through traffic at 
Britomart station 
allows 3x trains/hour 
to suburbs
$2bn construction 
cost
CBD RAIL LINK: COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS
Cost-benefit analysis1 Cost ($m) Benefit ($m)
Capital and operating cost 1520
Revenue (users) 190
Decongestion of roads 673
Surplus for existing public transport users 409
Surplus for new public transport users 237
Net CBD increased productivity 3333
Net benefit 3322
Benefit-cost ratio (BCR) 3.5
1 KiwiRail & Auckland Transport (2010)
2010 dollars, net present value at 8% discount rate.
FUNDING PROPOSAL: CBD RAIL LINK
Central government reluctant to commit, citing:
– current Auckland infrastructure commitments
– rising debt due to global financial crisis
– Christchurch earthquake costs
Funding proposal1 Cost ($m) Contribution ($m)
Capital and operating cost 1520
Revenue (users) 190
Shortfall 1330
Local government (targeted rates) 532
Central government 798
1 KiwiRail & Auckland Transport (2010) 
INTERNAL FUNDING LOOKS FEASIBLE
A BCR 3.5 project is extremely attractive
– Only need to appropriate 29% of total benefits to 
cover full costs (anything else is profit)
– A single organisation should jump at the project
Gains from trade sufficiently high that it should be 
possible for multiple institutions to bargain to 
achieve the same outcome (Coase Theorem)
So why is this not occurring?
– Three possible barriers: public goods, consumer 
surplus appropriation and coordination costs
1. PUBLIC GOODS
Classic problem: lighthouse services
– non-excludable and non-rival, requiring tax funding
– Solution: fund via an excludable and rival (private 
good) proxy for use, e.g. port berthing charges or 
seafarer‟s union fees
Rail transport user benefits are private goods
Increased CBD productivity is a private benefit
– to landowners, firms and employees
Decongestion benefit is rival
– excludable via congestion charging (e.g. CBD 
cordon)
2. CONSUMER SURPLUS APPROPRIATION
If the benefits of an improved service accrue 
only to consumers (e.g. because of a price 
ceiling) then it may not be possible to fund the 
improvement
Price ceilings may arise in public transport due 
to patronage or low-income access targets
– Project revenue of $190m c.f. consumer surplus of 
$646m highly suggestive of a price ceiling
Price discrimination can achieve both goals
– Technically enabled by integrated ticketing
APPROPRIATING THE BENEFITS
Benefit $m Mechanism
Decongestion of roads 673 Congestion charging
Surplus for existing public transport users 409 •Increased fares
•Price discriminationSurplus for new public transport users 237
Net CBD increased productivity 3333 •Targeted rates
•Tax increment 
financing
Public goods and consumer surplus appropriation 
problems appear solveable
3. COORDINATION COSTS
Multiple parties involved, with different:
– expectations of the future
– abilities to appropriate gains
– exposure to risk
– access to funds
– regulatory restrictions
– institutional biases
– political/decision-making cycles
Very costly to reach agreement
– Only partly addressed by council amalgamations
COORDINATION PROBLEM: PLANNING
Source: Auckland Transport Plan 2009
Plus the new 
spatial plan!
COORDINATION PROBLEM: FUNDING
Based on: Auckland Transport Plan 2009
COORDINATION PROBLEM: ORGANISATIONS
SUMMARY
If CBD rail link CBA is robust, Auckland Council 
should be able to self-fund it via increased 
passenger fares, congestion charging and/or 
targeted rates
High coordination costs or institutional bias 
most plausible explanation for making project 
contingent on central government funding
Can institutions be redesigned to reduce 
coordination costs?
POSSIBLE WAYS FORWARD
Use ownership to align interests
– Should AT own the commuter rail network?
– Should AT own the Auckland state highway 
network?
– AT could control AKL share of NZTA revenue
Simplify planning
– Are there too many parties with veto power?
– Is the integration of planning over-valued?
• Trade-off between planning gridlock and „optimal‟ 
infrastructure
• Auckland is big enough to take risks…
QUESTIONS & DISCUSSION
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